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CORPORATION LAW: DELAWARE SUPREME COURT EXERCISES ITS
OWN BUSINESS JUDGMENT,

Zapata Corporation v. Maldonado, 430

A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The derivative suit' is a device by which minority shareholders can

enforce corporate rights that are violated by corporate management.
The business judgment rule' is the defense mechanism asserted by the
board of directors to compel dismissal of the shareholder's suit.3 The

continued vitality of derivative suits has been seriously threatened by
state and federal decisions which have consistently upheld reliance on
the business judgment rule as a grounds for disinterested directors to

dismiss derivative actions they deem detrimental to the corporation.4

Provided the directors do not stand in a "dual relation" creating the

risk of biased decisions, the traditional application of the rule bars judi1. A derivative suit is brought by a shareholder on behalf of the corporation which has been
wronged, but which refuses to assert the cause of action. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES §§ 358-360 (2d ed. 1970). When there is a
wrong to a corporation, redress must be sought in a derivative suit. W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA
OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5908 (rev. perm. ed. 1980). See, e.g., Continental Sec.
Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138 (1912)(the shareholder's derivative action in a sense
involves a double wrong to the corporation: (1) the basic wrong done to it, and (2) its not redressing the wrong directly).
2. The business judgment rule sustains corporate transactions and immunizes management
from liability when the transaction is within the powers of the corporation and the authority of
management. By definition, the rule presupposes an honest, unbiased judgment and compliance

with applicable fiduciary duties. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 242 (2d ed. 1970). See note 38 infra.

OF CORPORATIONS AND

3. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 93 (1979). "The
business judgment rule is a defensive rule, the effect of which is to permit corporate directors to
exercise their discretion in managing the corporation's business affairs in the manner they deem in
the corporation's best interests in accordance with their power to govern the corporation pursuant
to 8 Del. C. § 141(a)." Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1256 (Del.Ch. 1980). See also Note,
Corporations- The Business Judgment Rule Shields the Good Faith Decision of Disinterested
Directors to Terminate a Derivative Suit Against the Corporation'sDirectors, 25 VILL. L. REV.
551 (1979-80).
4. Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the
Derivative Suit, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96, 98 (1980) (hereinafter cited as Dent). Dent points out
that "[t]he rule generally has been held not to apply if a majority of the board is implicated in the
alleged wrong." Id. at 97.
5. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263 (1917)
("Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires the corporation, except where the
directors are guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or where they stand in a dual
relation which prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment."). The rule generally cannot be
applied if a majority of the board is involved in the wrongdoing. Yet, recent cases have permitted
dismissal if a duly appointed investigative committee not involved in the wrongdoing decides in its
business judgment that the suit is not in the best interest of the corporation. Dent, supra note 4, at
97. See also Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F.Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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cial inquiry into actions of directors taken in good faith and in honest
pursuit of the legitimate purposes of the corporation.
This long line of precedent was broken in May, 1981, with the
Supreme Court of Delaware decision Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.7 In
this decision, the Delaware court created a new two prong test to be
employed when deciding whether directors' dismissal of a derivative
suit is proper. The change of precedent occurs in the test's second step
which calls upon the trial court to exercise its own business judgment
to decide whether the board's motion to dismiss a shareholder's derivative suit should be granted. 8 "'This means, of course, that instances
could arise where a committee can establish its independence and
sound basis for its good faith decisions and still have the corporation's
motion denied."' 9 This note outlines the reasoning behind the Zapata
court's new approach, and discusses its potential impact on future appeals determining the validity of an independent board's decision not to
sue.'

0

II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

In 1970, the board of directors of Zapata Corporation adopted a
stock option plan granting to certain officers and directors options to
purchase Zapata common stock."' The exercise of the option was to be
6. See, e.g., Abramowitz v. Posner, 513 F.Supp. 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (judicial inquiry into the board's

business judgment not to sue is forbidden unless those reaching the decision are deemed to have
acted in bad faith or not independently); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980). See also Brodsky, Terminating Derivative Cases

Under Business Judgment Rule, New York Law Journal, May 20, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
7. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). This decision reversed the chancery court's decision. See notes
27-28 and accompanying text infra.
8. Missing from the Zapata test is the usual presumption that the board acts in good faith
and in the best interests of the corporation unless proven otherwise. J. Coffee & D. Schwartz, The
Survival of the Derivative Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal For Legislative Reform, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981) (hereinafter cited as Coffee). See Hays, A Study In Trial Tactics:
Derivative Stockholder's Suits, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1943) (Some courts have lost

sight of the fundamental principles concerning the value of minority shareholder's actions. The
result has been exculpation of corporate fiduciaries in instances where liability would otherwise
have followed). Cf Jackson v. Ludeling, 88 U.S. 616, .624 (21 Wall. 1874) (interested directors'
dealings with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and, where any of their contracts
or engagements with the corporation are challenged, the burden is on the director not only to
prove the good faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness).
9. 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
10. The law of the state of incorporation is decisive on the question whether directors have
power of dismissal. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(c).
11. The Zapata Corporation was incorporated in Delaware in 1954. The company is engaged in drilling oil and gas wells in foreign and domestic waters. Zapata and its subsidiaries also
engage in fishing and mining industries. MOODY'S INDUSTRIAL MANUAL, 3531 (1981). A management stock option plan affords the privilege of obtaining shares at less than the fair market price.
It is viewed as a bonus form of compensation for the purpose of retaining executive, key, and
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in separate installments ending July 14, 1974."' Prior to the time for
the final option, Zapata also planned a tender offer's of its own shares
to be announced shortly before July 14, 1974. Announcement of the
offer was expected to cause an increase in the market value of Zapata
stock. 4
Zapata's directors, many of whom were optionees of the 1970
plan, realized that if the final option were exercised after the tender
offer announcement, they would incur additional federal income tax liability due to the increased difference between the option price and the
market price of Zapata stock. 15 To avoid the increased tax, Zapata's
directors accelerated the date of the last option to July 2, 1974. On
that day, after exercising their options, the directors ceased market
trading of Zapata shares pending announcement of the tender offer.
The announcement was made on July 8, 1974, and the prices of Zapata
stock promptly rose.' 6
In 1975, William Maldonado, a stockholder of Zapata Corporation, instituted a derivative action' 7 in the Delaware Court of Chancery
against the directors and officers involved in planning the acceleration.
Maldonado claimed that modification of the stock option plan constituted a breach of fiduciary duty' s owed to the corporation and its
shareholders.' 9 Maldonado did not first demand that the board bring
qualified personnel. W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §
2143.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1980). See also B. MANNING, A CONCISE TEXTBOOK ON LEGAL CAPITAL

145 (1977) (stock option plans are a form of incentive compensation because they increase the
executive's equity position in the corporation and conserve the assets of the corporation).
12. In 1971, Zapata shareholders ratified this plan. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251,
1254 (Del.Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado 430 A.2d 779
(Del. 1981).
13. Generally a tender offer is an invitation by a corporation to shareholders of the "target
company" to sell their shares at a specified consideration. The offer is usually above the market
price of the securities sought, and is for a limited time period. W. CARY, M. EISENBERG, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS, 1562 (5th ed. 1980). See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 203
(supp. 1980).
14. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1254 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub
nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). At the time the price of stock was
$18.19 per share to be raised to nearly $25.00 per share for the tender offer price. Id.
15. The additional tax liability was due to the amount of capital gain that would be realized. This amount would depend on the difference between the option price and the market price.
The optionees would pay the price difference between the $12.15 option price and the price on the
date of the exercise; i.e., $18.00-$19.00 if exercised prior to the tender offer, or nearly $25.00 if
exercised afterwards. Id.
16. Id.
17. See note 1 supra, for a definition of a shareholder's derivative suit. See also DEL. CH.
CT. R. 23.1 DERIVATIVE ACTIONS BY SHAREHOLDERS,. See note 20 infra.
18. Directors owe fiduciary duties to their corporation. Corporate managerial powers are
powers in trust and thereby must be exercised honestly and in good faith. H. HENN. HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 235 (2d ed. 1970).
19.

Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1255 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub
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the action; he claimed demand would be futile since all directors were
named as defendants and allegedly participated in the acts specified."'
In June, 1977, Maldonado commenced a second action in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York against
nine of the directors, alleging federal security law violations as well as
the common law claims made in the court of chancery.2 1
By June, 1979, four of the defendant directors were no longer on
the board, and two new directors had been appointed by the remaining
directors. The two new directors were designated to act as an "Independent Investigative Committee"' 2 for the purpose of determining
whether either of Maldonado's actions or an action then pending in
Texas28 against the directors should continue. In view of its findings,
the committee concluded that the three actions should "be dismissed
forthwith as their continued maintenance is inimical to the Company's
best interests."'
Pursuant to the committee's directive Zapata moved for dismissal
or summary judgment in both the state and the federal derivative acnom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981). More specifically, Maldonado
claimed that the acceleratiorq of the option date deprived the corporation of a tax deduction in an
amount equal to the taxes saved by the optionees. The defendant directors denied these allegations
and claimed that if there was any deduction it would have been minimal due to operating and
capital loss carrybacks available to the corporation for income tax purposes. Id.
20. Since the United States Supreme Court case, Hawes v. City of Oakland, 104 U.S. 450
(1882), a plaintiff shareholder has a duty to make demands on directors as a prerequisite to

maintaining his suit. Note, Demand on Directors and Shareholders as a Prerequisiteto a Deriva-

tive Suit, 73 HARV. L. REV. 746, 748 (1960). The reason for this duty is that a shareholder
seeking to file a derivative suit must first exhaust available intracorporate remedies by making a
demand on the board of directors to bring suit. Coffee, note 8 supra, at 262. It is well established,
however, that demand need not be made on the board if a majority of the directors are involved in
the alleged wrongdoing. W. CARY, M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 926
(5th ed. 1980). E.g., Mayer v. Adams, 37 Del. Ch. 298, 141 A.2d 458 (1958); Sohland v. Baker,.
15 Del. Ch. 431, 141 A. 277 (1927); Continental Sec. Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 99 N.E. 138
(1912). The demand requirement has been codified in FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b) and DEL. CH. CT. R.
23.1 which states in pertinent part: "The complaint shall allege with particularity the efforts if
any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action he desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort." See also Heit
v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157 (1st Cir. 1957) (the purpose of the demand requirement is to require
resort to the body legally charged with conduct of the company's affairs before licensing suit in
the company's name by persons not so charged).
21. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
22. Corporations facing a derivative action have used the Independent Investigative Committee to attempt to avoid court holdings that the board's refusal to sue will not block a derivative
suit where a majority of the directors are defendants. See Dent, supra note 4, at 105.
23. Maher v. Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980). Plaintiffs filed a shareholder's derivative suit pursuant to the federal securities laws, the Texas Business Corporation Act
and the common law for the same wrongdoing. The court denied Zapata's motion for summary
judgment in an opinion consistent with Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), revd
and remanded sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
24. 430 A.2d at 781.
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tions. On January 24, 1980, the District Court for the Southern District of New York granted Zapata's motion for summary judgment in
the federal action, holding, under its interpretation of Delaware law," 5
that the committee had authority, in the exercise of its business judgment, to require termination of the derivative action. 6 Maldonado appealed that decision to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
On March 18, 1980, the Delaware Court of Chancery denied
Zapata's motion in the state action, holding first that Delaware law
does not sanction this means of dismissal, and second that the "business
judgment, rule is not a grant of authority for directors or a committee
to compel dismissal of derivative actions. 7 More specifically, the court
held that under the facts before it, the shareholder maintained an individual right to pursue derivative litigation."
The Zapata Corporation filed an interlocutory appeal from the
chancery court decision to the Delaware Supreme Court in June,
1980. 29 In May, 1980, the court of chancery granted a motion to dismiss Maldonado's action on res judicata principles, contingent on the
second circuit affirming the New York district court's decision.' 0 The
second circuit appeal was ordered stayed pending the Delaware Supreme Court's resolution of the appeal from the court of chancery's
decision to deny dismissal and summary judgment.
25. See note 10 supra. The district court relied mainly on two Delaware cases; Abbey v.
Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) and Beard
v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 160 A.2d 731, 738 (1960), in which the Supreme Court of Delaware
stated: "We think the fact that a disinterested Board of Directors reached this decision by the
exercise of its business judgment is entitled to the utmost consideration by the courts in passing
upon the results of that decision. Such has long been the law of this state." Maldonado v. Flynn,
485 F. Supp. 274, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
26. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 286-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
27. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1262 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub
noma.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
28.

Id.

29. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
30. Maldonado v. Flynn, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980). Maldonado brought suit asserting
breach of fiduciary duty by Zapata directors. Zapata Corporation moved to dismiss this action on
the basis that the decision in Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) was a final
judgment and binding on all issues pending. In the district court case, Maldonado had amended
his complaint deleting the common law claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Thus the chancery
court granted Zapata's motion to dismiss holding that Maldonado's failure to present all his theories of recovery in the district court precluded his assertion of such theories if the district court
judgment dismissing his claim was not overturned on appeal. The chancery court judge stated:
If the result seems harsh in view of my March 18, 1980, ruling that Zapata does not
have the power under Delaware law to compel dismissal of a stockholder's derivative suit
by relying on the business judgment rule, it should be remembered that sound policy mandates but one trial for one claim.
417 A.2d 378, 385 (Del. Ch. 1980).
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Finding the Zapata Corporation was "in a procedural gridlock," '
the Delaware Supreme Court recognized the need to determine
whether the committee had the power to dismiss in order to decide if
the chancery court decision allowing the shareholder to sue directly
should be maintained. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case, directing the chancery court to apply a two-step test
to determine whether to grant the board's motion to dismiss. Under the
first part of the test, the court was to inquire into the committee's independence and good faith and into the quality of the investigations it
made. The test placed on the corporation the burden of proving independence, good faith, and that a reasonable investigation had been
made. 2 If the burden was not met or the court was not satisfied for
other reasons relating to the process, including but not limited to, the
good faith of the committee, the corporation's dismissal motion was to
be denied. If, however, in accordance with Court of Chancery Rule
5618 standards, the court was satisfied that the committee was independent and showed reasonable basis for good faith findings, the court
could in its discretion proceed to the second prong of the test.
The second prong required the court to exercise its own business
judgment to determine whether the derivative suit should be dismissed." In doing so the court must consider how compelling is the
corporate interest in dismissing a nonfrivolous suit and, if appropriate,
consider matters of law, public policy, and the corporation's best interests. The Zapata court stressed this step as the key to Striking the balance between legitimate corporate claims set forth in the shareholder's

31.

430 A.2d at 781.

32. A court must determine whether the committee has conducted an adequate investigation. The investigation must at least have been conducted with due care; that is, with the care and
skill that a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances would use. Dent, supra note 4,
at 128. See Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (the defendant corporation required its special committee to follow a specific procedure to ensure that their investigation
would be deemed to be adequate and reasonable).
33. Delaware Chancery Court Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
(b) For Defending Party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, crossclaim or declaratory judgment is asserted may, at any time,'move with or without supporting affidavits
for a summary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motions and Proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 10 days before
the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve
opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages, or some other matter.
R. 56.
430 A.2d at 789.

DEL. CH. CT.

34.
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suit, and the corporation's interest as expressed by the independent
committee. 8 '
III. ANALYSIS
A basic premise underlying the corporate structure is that the corporation is to be managed by or under the authority of the board of
directors.86 This vested authority has been protected from judicial attack by the business judgment rule.87 Reliance on this rule has consistently enabled courts to uphold refusals by boards of directors to maintain shareholder derivative suits deemed not to be in the best interests
of the corporation." More recently, the rule has been extended to uphold decisions of independent investigative committees appointed when
the directors are involved in wrongdoing alleged in the derivative suit.8"
Permitting the board this wide discretion often effectively strips the minority shareholder of his right to sue derivatively.' Concomitant with
35. Id.
36. See Eisenberg, Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation
Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 375 (1975) (the legal model of corporate
operating procedure is pyramidal: at the base is the shareholder; at the next level is the board of
directors whose duties are to select officers, make policy, and generally manage the corporation's
business). Corporation statutes generally provide that the business of a corporation shall be managed by its board of directors. For example, Delaware Code § 141(a) provides in part: "The
business and affairs of every corporation organized under this Chapter shall be managed by or
under the direction of a board of directors." DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a).
37. See notes 2-3 supra for an explanation of how the Rule operates.
38. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited. 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97-100 (1979)
(the business judgment rule grew principally from the judicial concern that competent individuals
would not serve as directors if the law exacted from them a degree of precision not possessed by
people of ordinary knowledge. The rule is a necessary recognition of human fallibility). See also
United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, note 5 supra; Ash v. International Business Machines Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966)
(minority stockholder lacked standing to maintain derivative suit absent a showing that refusal of
directors to sue in the corporation's behalf was fraudulent, collusive, or represented anything
worse than unsound business judgment honestly exercised in corporate interest); Bennett v. Propp
41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962) (holding president and chairman liable for damages but
allowing the business judgment rule as a defense for directors who ratified chairman's unauthorized stock purchase).
39. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920
(1979) (the business judgment rule shields deliberations and conclusions of chosen representatives
if they possess disinterested independence and do not stand in dual relations which prevent an
unprejudiced exercise of judgment). Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980) (good faith exercise of business judgment by a special litigation committee of disinterested directors is immune from attack by shareholders or the courts). Maldonado
v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (even where some board members are disqualified
from participating in board decisions, actions taken by independent, disinterested directors in exercise of their independent business judgment will be sustained).
40. See Block & Barton, The Business Judgment Rule As Applied to Stockholder Proxy
Derivative Suits Under the Securities Exchange Act, 8 SEc. REG. L. J. 99, 121 (1980)("If business judgment dismissal of derivative suits is permitted, shareholders may be deprived of the ability to mandate a fundamental corporate claim ....
"). Hays, A Study in Trial Tactics: DerivaPublished by eCommons, 1981
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reliance upon the business judgment rule in this situation is the concern
that if the rule is not applied to these board decisions the corporation
could easily be subjected to frivolous and vexatious litigation.4 1 The
Zapata court sought to strike a new balance between these opposing
interests. 2
A.

Previous Application of the Business Judgment Rule

A logical starting point for discussing shareholders' derivative
suits " is the leading case of Burks v. Lasker,44 in which the United
States Supreme Court held that, in suits alleging violation of federal
laws, a court is to apply state law governing the authority of independent directors to discontinue derivative suits, to the extent that such
law is consistent with the policy underlying the federal laws.45
The first case to follow the Burks analysis was Abbey v. Control
Data Corp.,4' a case arising out of Delaware. The Abbey court held
4

tive Stockholders' Suits, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 275, 277 (1943) ("The minority shareholders' suit is
often the only instrumentality by which the scattered majority of shareholders can effectively exercise any control over the management.").
41. Block & Barton, The Business Judgment Rule as Applied to Stockholder Proxy Derivative Suits Under the Securities Exchange Act, 8 SEc. REG. L.J. 99, 122 (1980)(if business judgment dismissal is precluded, the corporation may be forced to fund massive litigation expenses
without a reasonable expectation of achieving a benefit in excess of such expenses). Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979) (accepting plaintiff shareholders' assertions to disqualify the board would render the corporation powerless to make an
effective business judgment regarding the derivative suit).
42. 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1980).
43. The business judgment rule has often been confused and applied inconsistently to shareholder derivative suits. It has been noted that Delaware decisions have been the most highly criticized for the way they have applied the rule. Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited. 8
HOFSTRA L. REv. 93, 94 (1979).
44. 441 U.S. 471 (1979). While there are cases before Burks and its progeny, they generally do not deal with the peculiar problem of claims against members of the board of directors
arising out of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and/or violation of the federal security laws.
Prior cases employ the business judgment rule to dismiss derivative actions against unrelated third
parties. E.g., Ash v. International Business Machines, Inc., 353 F.2d 491 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 927 (1966); United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261

(1917).
45. 441 U.S. 471, 486 (1979). The Burks Court did not detail the precise nature of either
inquiry. The Court did, however, explain that absent inconsistency with federal law, state law was
primary on issues of corporate government. It stated, "[m]utual funds, like other corporations, are
incorporated pursuant to state, not federal law. . . . The Investment Company Act does not purport to be the source of authority for managerial power; rather, the Act functions primarily to
controls and restrictionson the internal management of investment companies." Id.
'impose' .
at 478.
46. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980). In Abbey, shareholders sued derivatively to recover illegal payments made by seven board members to foreign governments. In response to the suit, the board created an autonomous "Special Litigation Committee"
to investigate the charges. The committee concluded that the suit was not in the best interests of
the corporation. Id. at 726-28.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/9

1982]

NOTES

that under Delaware law the business judgment rule protects any reasonable good faith determination by an independent board of directors
that a derivative suit is not in the best interests of the corporation. 47
The problems arising out of the Abbey decision and similar cases' 8
are threefold. First, these decisions failed to distinguish the traditional
business judgment rule from the independent committee's specialized
business judgment not to sue. The former is the traditional defense asserted by members of the board of directors when their actions as managers of the corporation are challenged.' 9 The latter pertains to the
propriety of an independent committee's decision not to sue made after
the alleged wrongdoing has been challenged.50 Second, the impact of
the Burks analysis was ignored when these courts applied almost nonexistent state law as being consistent with federal policy.5 1 Finally, they
failed to make a factual determination of the disinterestedness of directors;5 2 so long as the deciding directors were not implicated in the alleged wrongdoing their decision not to sue was automatically
respected.53

47. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
48. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980).
Relying on the Abbey decision, the ninth circuit held that the good fith exercise of business
judgment by a special litigation committee of disinterested directors is immune from attack by
shareholders or the courts. Id. at 783. See also Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (the business judgment rule is applicable to decision by special litigation committee acting
as corporation's board of directors in deciding not to sue); Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d
Cir. 1980)(court concluding it was necessary to examine the state law to determine if defendant
directors could dismiss the derivative suit on the basis of the business judgment rule).
49. There is a necessary distinction between the traditional "business judgment rule" and
the "business judgment" not to sue. The former is the defense asserted by the board of directors
when their actions as managers of the corporation are challenged. The latter goes to the propriety
of an independent committee's decision not to sue after the alleged wrongdoing has been challenged. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251, 1257 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
50. See Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600 (1980). In regard to treatment given to the latter type of "business judgment"
the author states: "Most courts have applied the business judgment and refuse to review the decision of these committees." Id. at 608.
51. Brodsky, Business - Judgment Rule, New York Law Journal, July 2, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
52. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 61 (2d Cir. 1980). In Galef the court treated the
issue of "disinterestedness" as a question of law not fact. Specifically, the court stated: "It may be
that under Ohio law a director's being sued merely on account of having authorized, without
financial interest, the underlying transaction does not make him sufficiently 'interested' to deprive
him of the power to initiate a business judgment summary dismissal of the suit." Id. But see
Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)("No court is required to take for
granted that the committee members exercised their business judgment in good faith, thus the
shareholder is free to challenge the committee's bona fides.").
53. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 628, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d
920, 928 (1979)(maintaining that courts cannot inquire into factors considered by the committee
the court stated: "Inquiry into such matters would go to the very core of the business judgment
rule made by the committee. To permit judicial probing of such issues would be to emasculate the
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The Maldonado cases," although derived from the Abbey line of
reasoning, reached incongruous results. The New York district court
decision" followed the Burks analysis and also made a factual determination regarding the "disinterestedness"'5 of an independent committee. The court concluded, however, that Delaware case law upholding
the business judgment, of directors implied that the board of directors
of a Delaware corporation had the authority to terminate derivative

suits.' 7 Conversely, the Delaware Chancery Court decision" distinguished the two types of business judgments" maintaining that the
traditional business judgment is irrelevant to the decision not to sue,
because it is not applicable as a defense to the independent board's
actions.60 The chancery court held further that a shareholder maintained an individual right to assert his cause of action.",
B.

Reversing the Opinion Below

The Supreme Court of Delaware disagreed with both findings of
the chancery court's decision. First, according to the Zapata court, the
rule that a shareholder maintains an individual right to sue derivatively

business judgment doctrine as applied to the actions and determinations of the special litigation
committee."). Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 165, 160 A.2d 731, 738-39 (1960) (where board
members are disqualified from participating in the board's decision, actions taken by independent,
disinterested directors in the exercise of their independent business judgment will be sustained)..
Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 279-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (applying Delaware law, a committee of disinterested directors may in the exercise of their business judgment require termination of a shareholder's derivative suit even though directors are named as defendants in the suit).
54. Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), Maldonado v. Flynn 413 A.2d
1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
(Del. 1981). See notes 17-29 and accompanying text supra for explanation and holdings.
55. 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
56. "The cornerstone of the business judgment rule is the independence and disinterestedness of the directors charged with responsibility for decisions." Id. at 282.
57. Id. at 278-79. The Court relied on Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980) (citing Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 165, 160 A.2d 731,
738-39 (1960) which stated: "We think the fact that a disinterested Board of Directors reaches
this decision by the exercise of its business judgment is entitled to the utmost consideration by the
courts in passing upon the results of that decision. Such has long been the law of this State.").
Contra, Coffee, supra note 8 at 274, in which the author discussed the district court case, noting
that Delaware has no precedent directly dealing with a board decision not to sue.
58. Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1980).
59. See note 49 and accompanying text supra.
60. 413 A.2d at 1257.
61. Id. at 1262. The chancery court recognized the demand requirement but stated:
The purpose of a pre-suit demand is only to require the stockholder to show he has good
cause to depart from the policy that the directors are normally the persons to control the
corporation, and the ones who should ordinarily bring and dismiss litigation on its behalf.
Its purpoge is not to entirely deny the stockholder the right to redress a breach of fiduciary
duty to the corporation.
Id. at 1262.
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after demand has been made and refused is erroneous. 62 The court
found the demand requirement to be evidence that managerial power is
at all times retained by the board.63 Distinguishing the cases relied
upon by the lower court, the supreme court concluded that only where
demand is excused because it is futile does the shareholder possess the
ability to initiate the action individually on his corporation's behalf."
The court made clear that where demand is required, "a board decision
to cause a derivative suit to be dismissed as detrimental to the company, after demand has been made and refused, will be respected unless it is wrongful." 6
Second, the Zapata court refuted the chancery court's contention
that an independent committee appointed after the charge by the
shareholder cannot compel dismissal merely by reviewing the suit and
making a business judgment that it is not in the best interests of the
corporation.66 The supreme court maintained that a board may delegate its power to a board of disinterested directors by virtue of § 141 (c)
of Delaware's corporation laws. 67 Otherwise, if the corporate right was

62. 430 A.2d at 782. Cf. note 61 supra.
63. Id. at 785-86.
64. Id. at 784. The court relied on Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277 (Del. 1927) to support its
proposition that if demand is made and refused, the shareholder maintains an absolute right to
continue a derivative suit. The supreme court upheld Sohland, but distinguished it from the present case on its facts and holding. The Sohland court stated the right of a shareholder to file a bill
to litigate depends on the facts of each case. 141 A. 277, 282 (Del. 1927). According to the
Zapata court this language only supports the shareholder's right to initiate the lawsuit. "It does
not support an absolute right to continue to control it." 430 A.2d at 783.
65. Id. at 784 n.10. In footnote the court pointed out that this
decision not to sue falls under
the "business judgment rule" and will be respected if the requirements of the rule are met.
66. Id. at 785.
67. Delaware general corporation law § 141(c) states:
(c) The board of directors may, by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board,
designate 1 or more committees, each committee to consist of 1 or more of the directors of
the corporation. The board may designate 1 or more directors as alternate members of any
committee, who may replace any absent or disqualified member at any meeting of the
committee. The bylaws may provide that in the absence or disqualification of a member of
a committee, the member or members present at any meeting and not disqualified from
voting, whether or not he or they constitute a quorum, may unanimously appoint another
member of the board of directors to act at the meeting in the place of any such absent or
disqualified member. Any such committee, to the extent provided in the resolution of the
board of directors, or in the bylaws of the corporation, shall have and may exercise all the
powers and authority of the board of directors in the management of the business and
affairs of the corporation, and may authorize the seal of the corporation to be affixed to all
papers which may require it; but no such committee shall have the power or authority in
reference to amending the certificate of incorporation, adopting an agreement of merger or
consolidation, recommending to the stockholders the sale, lease or exchange of all or substantially all of the corporation's property and assets, recommending to the stockholders a
dissolution of the corporation or a revocation of a dissolution, or amending the bylaws of
the corporation; and, unless the resolution, bylaws, or certificate of incorporation expressly
so provide, no such committee shall have the power or authority to declare a dividend or to
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permitted to vest in the complaining shareholder or group, recognition
would be given to their interest to the exclusion of all other interests in
the corporation. 8
The question for the Zapata court became, "[w]hen if at all,
should an authorized board committee be permitted to cause litigation,
properly initiated by a derivative shareholder in his own right to be
dismissed?"" Finding that Delaware statute § 141(c) permits a board
to delegate its authority, the Zapata court concluded that a committee
in possession of this authority would have power to move for dismissal
or summary judgment.7 0 The court stated that, without such i procedure, "a single stockholder in an extreme case *might control the
destiny of the entire corporation. ' 71 Thus it rejected the chancery
the appointed board could not determine the
court's contention 7that
2
destiny of the suit.
C. The Zapata Test
The Zapata court, reversing the chancery court's opinion, upheld
the basic power of a board or a properly delegated committee thereof,
to control the destiny of a shareholder's derivative suit.7 3 The ultimate
result was the formulation of a new test to be used when deciding
whether to grant an independent committee's motion to dismiss a
shareholder's derivative suit found by the committee not to be in the
best interest of the corporation.
The test is as follows: first the court of chancery is to inquire into
the committee's good faith and independence, and into the adequacy of
its reasons for deciding the suit should be terminated. Limited discovery is permitted on this inquiry, 4 with the burden of proof being placed

authorize the issuance of stock.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(c).
68. 430 A.2d at 785.
69. Id. The suit was properly initiated, and Maldonado never made demand on the board,
claiming it to be futile. The supreme court treated the demand as properly excused on the'facts of
the case, given the involvement of the directors in the stock option issue. Thus this question asked
by the court concerning the power of the disqualified board is clearly distinguished from the case
in which demand is required. See note 65 and accompanying text supra.
70. 430 A.2d at 785.
71. id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 789. See Brodsky, Business-Judgment Rule. New York Law Journal, May 20,
1981, at 1, col. 1 (the Delaware Supreme Court did not claim that the decision of the board to
terminate is to be given great weight and not be overruled unless erroneous nor that it is entitled
to a presumption that it is correct).
74. This step resembles that which has been used in similar cases; but in Zapata the burden
was on the corporation rather than the shareholder. See Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 151 (2d
Cir. 1980), in which the district court had granted defendant directors' motion to limit discovery
to the issue of defendants' good faith in exercising their business judgment to dismiss the suit. See
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on the corporation.76 The corporation must show the court that the independent committee was in fact disinterested,7 6 acted in good faith,
and made a reasonable investigation into the merits of the pending
suit." If the court is not satisfied that the corporation has adequately
met its burden of proof regarding the committee, the motion will be
denied.

8

Conversely, if the court deems the corporation to have adequately

shown that the committee is sufficiently independent and has offered

reasonable bases for its good faith determination that the suit is not in
the best interests of the corporation, then the court may, in its discretion, proceed to the second step.78 This second prong of the Zapata test
is "the essential key in striking the balance" 80 and maintaining only
suits based on legitimate corporate claims. It permits the chancery
court to exercise its own business judgment in determining whether the
suit is in the best interests of the corporation. "The Court of Chancery
of course must carefully consider and weigh how compelling the corporate interest in dismissal is when faced with a non-frivolous lawsuit." 8'
If the business judgment of the court is thereby satisfied it may proceed

also Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)(shareholder suing derivatively is
free to challenge the committee bona fides); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y.
1976)(plaintiff must show directors' lack of independence). But see Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d
1251 (Del. Ch. 1980), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779
(Del. 1981) (court placed burden of proving independence and good faith in the defendants).
75. The court justified placing the burden on the corporation by analogy to the intrinsic
fairness test employed when the actions of interested directors are attacked. 430 A.2d at 789 n. 17.
See, e.g.. Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952)(director owing fiduciary
duty has burden of establishing fairness of proposed plan). See also Delaware Code § 144(a)(3),
which permits transactions and contracts to be made between a corporation and its directors if:
"The contract or transaction is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved
or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee thereof, or the shareholders." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 144(a)(3).
76. "Disinterest is defined as lack of any financial stake . . . in the transaction." Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 793 (2d Cir. 1979) (lack of any involvement in the challenged
transactions). Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994 (1979), 419 N.Y.S.2d 920.
Independent director has been defined as the unaffiliated director, "which in turn means he is
supposed to safeguard the public - he's a watchdog - against the human tendency of management to take as much as they can get away with." Note, Mutual Funds as Investments of Large
Pools of Money, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 669, 739 (1967) (remarks of Abraham Pomerantz).
77. The Zapata court did not specify how the burden is to be met or what constitutes a
reasonable investigation. For an example of a committee's investigation, See Gall v. Exxon Corp.,
418 F. Supp. 508, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (the Committee must (A) retain special counsel; (B)
conduct a thorough review and investigation of the circumstances surrounding all matters referred
to in the claim; (C) reach a final determination, based on the report and opinion of special counsel, whether litigation should be undertaken against any directors).
78. 430 A.2d at 789.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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to grant the motion to dismiss.
According to the Zapata decision, application of the test is appropriate only when the corporation, on the advice of an independent committee, files a pretrial motion to dismiss in the Court of Chancery.82
The corporation, as the moving party, must be prepared to meet the
normal burden for summary judgment pursuant to rule 56.83 This burden may be met only after the committee has made a thorough and
objective investigation of the shareholder's derivative suit. With this in
mind the court is required to apply the test.
The first prong of the Zapata test is similar to that which has been
frequently employed in recent cases deciding motions to terminate derivative litigation. 84 "The corporation should have the burden of proving independence, good faith and a reasonable investigation, rather
than presuming independence, good faith and reasonableness." '88 A major concern for the Zapata court was the ability of an independent
committee to be truly disinterested. Practical consideration was given
to the fact that these directors were appointed by, and therefore passing judgment on, fellow directors.86 "The question naturally arises
whether a 'there but for the grace of God go I' empathy might not play
a role."' 87 The court was therefore skeptical whether an inquiry into the
independence and good faith of the committee was a sufficient safeguard against structural bias. Mere reliance on the business judgment
theory, or the presumption that the committee acted in good faith,
could not ensure the proper balance needed between maintaining bona
fide shareholder suits and avoiding litigation detrimental to the corporation. 8 The court found that placing on the corporation the burden of
showing the committee was disinterested and its decision was made in
good faith could diminish the potential for committee abuse and bias.89
82. Id.
83. See note 33 supra. Rule 56 accords determination of whether the plaintiff's claim has
merit. This is done without reference to the business judgment rule.
84. See note 74 supra. For a reference to the standard operating in recent cases.
85. 430 A.2d at 788.
86. Id. at 787. This concern for structural bias has been recognized before in conjunction
with excusing the need for demand on the board when such demand would be futile. See de Haas
v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968)(outside directors deemed not to be
the kind of aggressive majority that would undertake the difficult and demanding task of prosecuting a lawsuit for fraud against those who elected them) Cf. Mutual Funds as Investors of Large
Pools of Money, 115 U. PA. L. RaV. 669, 739 (1967) ("But obviously, you know and I know if
you are choosing an unaffiliated director or an independent director you are not going to choose
anybody who is going to be too hard on you.").
87. 430 A.2d at 787.
88. Courts have presumed that directors are disinterested unless the plaintiff presents evidence of bias. Commentators have said that such a presumption is unwarranted. Note, The Business Judgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 600, 619 (1980).
89. The court did not specify what is needed to meet this burden which formerly was on the
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To overcome these risks of committee abuse and bias, and to ensure the balance between allowing, legitimate shareholder claims and
protecting the corporation's best interests expressed by an independent
committee, the Zapata court set down its second step, enabling a deciding court to apply its own business judgment.' 0 Realizing the possibility
that there may be instances in which the committee's actions could satisfy the burden in step one but dismissal might still be inappropriate,
the court stated: "The second step is intended to thwart instances
where corporate actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result
does not appear to satisfy its spirit, or where corporate action would
simply prematurely terminate a stockholder grievance deserving of further consideration in the Corporation's interest."9 1 The standard for the
court to follow is that it must carefully consider and weigh how compelling the corporate interest is in seeking to terminate a non-frivolous
lawsuit. The court may consider issues of public policy in addition to
the corporation's best interests. If the court, in its independent business
judgment, is satisfied that the corporation's interest is compelling and
outweighs the interest in the non-frivolous derivative suit, it may grant
the dismissal motion, subject to any equitable terms found necessary.9"
To justify the substantive judicial review of the lower court, the
Zapata court made an analogy of the Chancery Rule 41(a) (2) standard used in settlement of a derivative suit.9 That rule requires that
plaintiff. See note 74 supra. In practice, however, this change makes a difference in procedure, but
not in result because the vast majority of cases do not turn on burden of proof issues. Brodsky,
Terminating Derivative Cases Under Business Judgment Rule, New York Law Journal, May 20,
1981, at 2, col. 1.
90. 430 A.2d at 789.
91. Id.
92. Id. The Zapata court's guidelines are broad and vague. It simply states:
The Court of Chancery of course must carefully weigh how compelling the corporate interest in dismissal is when faced with a non-frivolous lawsuit. The Court of Chancery should,
when appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition
to the corporation's best interests.
If the Court's independent business judgment is satisfied, the Court may proceed to
grant the motion, subject, of course, to any equitable terms or conditions the Court finds
necessary or desirable.
Id. at 789.
See Brodsky, Terminating Derivative Cases Under Business Judgment rule, New York Law
Journal, May 20, 1981 at I, col. 1.The author examines the problem and points out that by the
time a motion to dismiss is made, the committee has already shown its good faith, made its investigation, and decided how compelling the corporate interest is in dismissing the suit.
If the court finds that an independent committee acted in good faith and there is reasonable basis for the committee's conclusion it is difficult to predict what circumstances would
impel a court to overrule the business judgment of the board - aside from a policy reason
which the court, but not the board is compelled to consider.
Id.
93. DEL. CH. CT. R. 41(a)(2).
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"an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon
order of the Court and upon such. terms and conditions as the Court
deems proper. ' 94 This analogy could be considered bootstrapping by
the court, due to the fact that Delaware has no general requirement of
judicial approval of settlements in derivative actions.' 5 Yet, the two areas are so related that the rules may be integrated."
The Zapata decision recaptures the problem of when a derivative
suit brought by minority shareholders should be dismissed in accordance with a board committee's decision not to sue. The court's goal
was to strike a balance between honoring genuine shareholder actions
and encouraging directors' decisions to seek dismissal of suits that are
detrimental to the corporation.'7 The holding, ultimately employing a
new test, reflected dissatisfaction with previous decisions addressing the
identical problem. This new methodological approach deems the inquiry into the committee's good faith to be vital, but not sufficient, in
order to achieve this goal.
The test resulting from the court's attempt to achieve a balance
between the possibly competing interests of board committees and aggrieved shareholders has created three problems. First, notwithstanding
the Zapata court's concern for structural bias on the part of the committee, its decision still permits a board heavily dominated by defendants to delegate to an independent board its authority not to sue. Thus
the potential for structural bias on the part of the so called "disinterested" committee is still present.
Second, to safeguard against any abuse in dismissing a suit, the
Zapata test directs the court of chancery to exercise its own business
judgment. The Zapata court claimed this step was essential to strike
the balance between the derivative suit and the corporation's best interests.' 8 Yet, whether to exercise this business judgment is entirely discretionary with the individual chancery court judge. This would seem
to mean that appellate review will be essentially unavailable if the

94. Id.
95. Coffee, supra note 8, at 328. Cf Pernine v. Pennroad Corp., 47 A.2d 479, 487 (Del.
1946), Neponsit Inv. Co. v. Abramson, 405 A.2d 97, 100 (Del. 1979) ("In determining whether or
not to approve a proposed settlement of a derivative stockholders' action [when directors are on
both sides of the transaction] the Court of Chancery is called upon to exercise its own business
judgment.").
96. Coffee, supra, note 8, at 328 n.352. "On policy grounds, it seems a perverse result to
require greater procedural formality in the case of a settlement, where the corporation receives
some recovery, than in the case of a termination decision, where it receives none." Id.
97. The court stated: "We thus steer a middle course between those cases which yield to the
independent business judgmeni of a board committee and this case as determined below which
would yield to unbridled plaintiff stockholder control." 430 A. 2d at 788.
98. See note 80 and accompanying text supra.
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chancery court decides against using the second step. 9 If the second
step is essential, it is inconsistent to allow the chancery court to ignore
it.
Third, the Zapata court failed to set down guidelines for lower
courts to follow, except to direct them to give special consideration to
matters of law, public policy, and the corporation's best interests. The
only guidelines available to courts regarding the corporation's best interests are those established by the independent committees. It seems
unlikely then that the court's business judgment would ever be different
from the committee's. 100 While these three problems resulting from the
Zapata test are apparent, they remain to be grappled with as the test is
applied in the future. Nevertheless, the Zapata test is an improvement
over the typical approach presently used. 10 1
IV.

CONCLUSION

The business judgment rule has long been used as a barrier and a
defense to a shareholder's derivative suit. It is based on the premise
that the corporation's decision making power is vested in its board of
directors. Yet, when this power is abused and becomes the cause behind a derivative suit, problems of structural bias and conflicts of interest immediately arise. The remedial trend heretofore has been to place
the destiny of the suit in the hands of a disinterested committee. The
Zapata court, however, seriously questioned the ability of a committee
to be sufficiently disiiterested to make a bona fide decision, and guarantee the upholding of a meritorious and non-frivolous suit.
The Zapata court's goal was to strike a balance so that the business judgment rule could be relied upon by a corporation to avoid vexatious litigation, but could not be relied upon to avoid derivative suits
brought by aggrieved shareholders with meritorious claims. The
Zapata test permits the plaintiff to inquire into the merits of an independent committee's decision not to sue in hopes of finding factual issues to defeat the corporation's motion. Potentially, this may increase
the amount of litigation on the issue, but it removes the potential harm
of never allowing courts to review business judgments of supposedly
disinterested committees.

99. Coffee, supra note 8, at 330.
100. See Dent, supra note 4, at 99. Coffee, supra note 8, at 329. The authors contend that
although courts have been given new authority by virtue of the Zapata decision, they will continue
to defer to the business judgment of the board. "Engrained traditions do not disappear overnight,
rather they persist in ways that have low visibility." Coffee, supra note 8, at 329.
101. See, e.g.. Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1958); Issner v. Aldrich,
254 F. Supp. 696. 701-02 (D. Del. 1966). These cases and others demonstrate how courts have
consistently held that the business judgment rule applies even where certain directors are charged

with wrongdoing, so long as the deciding directors are independent and disinterested.
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The confidence placed in judicial competency by Zapata is great.
Questions arise as to the ability of a court to exercise its own business
judgment regarding the best interests of the corporation. It creates a
risk that the court will merely rely on the committee's reports and findings; however, the alternative of never allowing courts to review business judgments could ultimately lead to the death of the derivative suit.
Denise E. Griggs
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